A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939 (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939 Bruce Stadfeld A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939. Robin Jarvis Brownlie. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 206, illus. $89.95 How was Canadian Indian policy applied on the ground by Indian agents? Because Canadian historians have paid this question scant attention, Robin Jarvis Brownlie's A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939 is a welcome addition to the historiography on Aboriginal-non-Aboriginal relations. Brownlie provides a valuable local context in which to situate the literature on Canada's Indian policy, and her work will allow other scholars to identify provincial, cultural, and temporal differences. A Fatherly Eye, a reworked dissertation, is an Ontario case study of two adjacent Indian agencies on the north shore of Georgian Bay during the interwar years. The book is divided into six chapters and includes an introduction and short conclusion. The first chapter includes a general overview of the Aboriginal peoples of Georgian Bay (mostly Ojibway, Odawa, and Mohawk), the arrival of non-Natives, the signing of treaties, the setting aside of reserves, and the economic hardships of the interwar years. In chapter 2 Brownlie argues that although Indian agencies were micromanaged by a small group of Department of Indian Affairs bureaucrats in Ottawa, local administration was influenced by the personalities of Indian agents. She concludes that while Indian agent Robert J. Lewis's liberal individualistic approach meant more freedom for Aboriginals of the Manitowaning agency on Manitoulin Island, it also meant little assistance in times of need. In contrast, Indian agent John Mclean Daly's paternalism may have infuriated the Aboriginals of the [End Page 796] Parry Sound agency, but it also meant they were more likely to be provided for when thoroughly destitute. Chapter 3 contrasts how Lewis, the non-interventionist, and Daly, the micromanager, worked to either support or circumvent the band councils of their respective agencies. Brownlie emphasizes the role of Aboriginal soldiers returned from the First World War, their insistence on a greater say for band councils in local affairs, and attempts by the Indian agents to undermine the authority of these men. In chapter 4 Brownlie reviews the Indian agents' limited support for Aboriginal hunting and fishing rights and argues that they were concerned mainly with lessening Aboriginal destitution. The strongest chapter is chapter 5, a description of the differing cultural norms that complicated the delivery of social and financial assistance. According to Brownlie, Aboriginals expected a powerful and wealthy government to assist them in their times of need, while government officials expected Aboriginals to practise self-reliance. Chapter 6 is a potpourri. A section on the government's assimilation policy includes important insights into why some Indian agents discouraged enfranchisement. Another section on the regulation of Indian women's sexuality and gender is the most promising part of the book, but also the least developed because Brownlie decided to retain most of her work on this subject for a separate publication. In the conclusion, Brownlie cites the 1990 trial division decision in the Delgamuukw case as evidence that Canada's courts do not accept oral history as credible evidence. Apparently she is unaware that in its 1997 landmark decision in Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada not only ordered a new trial, but specifically endorsed the importance and validity of oral history. A case study can be made or broken on the choice of cases. Brownlie (who is refreshingly candid in explaining her research decisions) chose the Manitowaning and Parry Sound agencies because they had the most complete set of records for the interwar period and because she expected that their relatively short distance from her Toronto home would allow her to conduct oral history research. Unfortunately, neither reason appears to have paid dividends. Through no fault of her own, Brownlie had little success collecting oral histories because there were few elders with memories of the Indian agents' activities, and because those who could have helped were either unable or unwilling to assist her. Consequently, Brownlie was forced to rely heavily on the records...