A false Dilemma? Syria and Lebanon's independence during the mandatory period

Abstract

such argument was that Syrian acceptance of Lebanon's independence and subsequent accession to the Arab League had depended on an agreement between the two countries, containing Lebanese undertakings to Syria in the fields of foreign and defence policy. This agreement, it was argued, was sanctioned by the other members of the Arab League.2 In fact, this argument developed into a major comerstone in the policy of successive Syrian regimes vis-a-vis Lebanon, particularly during times of crisis in Lebanon and external challenges to Syria's special position in this country.3 This argument sheds light on the vexed question of the granting of independence to Lebanon, in the Second World War, and Syrian grappling with it. This question is one whose origins are traced back to the days following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent creation of states in territories which have long been interrelated socially, economically, intellectually and politically. Many Syrian nationalists refused to recognize the separation of Lebanon from Syria since the establishment of 'Greater Lebanon' by the French in 1920. The new state, in its entirely, was perceived by those Syrian nationalists as the 'Westem part' of 'Greater Syria'. During the short spell of Faisal's reign in Damascus (1918-20), they considered Lebanon an integral part of his kingdom.4 During most of the Mandatory period, the Lebanese question was a major stumbling block on the road to a Franco-Syrian agreement designed to terminate the Mandate. However, this state of affairs changed in the mid-1930s. Developments during the Second World War accelerated the pace of this change, brought it to a head, and finally forced the Syrians to grudgingly accept Lebanon's independence. This article argues that this acceptance reflected the effect of the interplay of three major factors: the state of local politics in the Levant, especially the development of nationalist movements in Syria and Lebanon and their bilateral relationship; the adversarial relationship between Great Britain and France, the two key external powers concerned with the Levant, and their