Abstract

With the development of e-commerce, the electronic auction is attracting the attention of many people. Many Internet companies, such as eBay and Yahoo!, have launched online auction systems. Many researchers have studied the security problems of electronic auction systems, but few of them are multi-attribute-based. In 2014, Shi proposed a provable secure, sealed-bid, and multi-attribute auction protocol based on the semi-honest model. We evaluated this protocol and found that it has some design weaknesses and is vulnerable to the illegal operations of buyers, which results in unfairness. In this paper, we improved this protocol by replacing the Paillier’s cryptosystem with the elliptic curve discrete (ECC), and we designed a novel, online, and multi-attribute reverse-auction system using the semi-honest model. In our system, sellers’ identities are not revealed to the buyers, and the buyers cannot conduct illegal operations that may compromise the fairness of the auction.

Highlights

  • IntroductionElectronic commerce, known as e-commerce, has developed quickly

  • In recent years, electronic commerce, known as e-commerce, has developed quickly

  • Based on whether they have opening bid prices, auctions can be classified into two types including sealed-bid auctions and open auctions [1]

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Summary

Introduction

Electronic commerce, known as e-commerce, has developed quickly. As for the determination of the final winner, either it is mainly proceeded by operators rather than the digitized and automated operation or the bids have not been properly protected so that bribing problems would occur in online government procurements Based on whether they have opening bid prices, auctions can be classified into two types including sealed-bid auctions and open auctions [1]. Goodare example of asellers double auction is the stock which gives buyers a chance to find the lowest-price seller. Based on how they determine the winner, auctions can be classified into single-attribute auctions invite, for example, the constructionauction, of infrastructure.

Different kinds of auctions:
Configurable Offer
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
Private Set Intersection
Homomorphic Property of the ECC
Semi-Honest Model
Related Work
Planning Phase
Security Defects
Adversary Model
Proposed Protocol
System Setup Phase
Bidding Phase
Winner Determination and Verification Phase
Correctness Proof
Security Analysis
Conclusions

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