A Dynamic-State-Estimator-Based Tolerance Control Method Against Cyberattack and Erroneous Measured Data for Power Systems

Abstract

Cyberattacks against measured variables and faulty metering devices are among the most important threats to modern systems that should be detected and isolated, and the control actions based on the measured variables should be appropriate in order to keep the power system security. This article proposes a dynamic-state-estimation-based cyberattack-tolerant control method for modern power systems. The proposed method involves two new schemes: one is for dynamically detecting the cyberattack and the other isolates the location of the attack. These schemes are based on dynamic observer designs that can eliminate the effects of unknown inputs. This article also proposes a fault-tolerant control technique using these observer-based detection and isolation schemes. The proposed method can accurately track dynamic states, detecting both cyberattack against measured variables and faulty measuring devices, and isolating the cyberattack and fault locations. The results verify its superiority in comparison with other techniques.