Abstract
This paper constructs a differential game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider the welfare effects of trade liberalization (tariff reductions). We show that welfare in autarky exceeds welfare in trade for any tariff level, namely that any trade is detrimental. Comparing our result with a static result, we discuss that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies in differential games plays a significant role in our argument.
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