A dynamic evolutionary game to discourage enterprise “greenwashing”

Abstract

To meet the increasing consumer demand for green products and services, governments have increased their regulation of enterprise production behaviors so that enterprises may choose “greenwashing” to obtain the premium of green products at the lowest cost under government regulation. The increase of greenwashing hinders green innovation by enterprises. To quantify this problem and seek solutions to promote enterprises cleaner production and sustainable development, we established a tripartite evolutionary game model for enterprises, consumers, and governments. Using the model, we analyzed the stability of their strategy combinations through simulations and explored the impact of some parameters on the strategy selection. We found that (1) the combination of enterprises adopting true green, consumers buying green products, and weak government regulation was the most environmentally friendly and low-cost strategy solution in the tripartite game system. (2) An increase in government penalties or subsidies to enterprises, as well as a reduction of the extra cost of producing green products, can improve the probability that enterprises will adopt cleaner production. Based on the results, the government should define reasonable subsidies and penalties, guide enterprises to assume their social responsibility, and stimulate consumer green demand. Enterprises should improve their moral qualities, actively engage in green innovation, and increase investment in green product research to guide the game system towards the ideal state.