A dynamic aspiration-based interaction strategy blocks the spread of defections in social dilemma

Abstract

Considering the time-varying selection criterions of neighbors, we propose a dynamic interaction strategy to determine interactive neighbors based on aspiration payoffs. Under this strategy, interactions decide the aspiration payoffs and interactive payoffs, after that, the group is divided into high-payoff and low-payoff subgroups. And individuals in the same subgroup constitute the interactions in turn, which indicates an internal feedback mechanism. Based on the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, simulations show that the introduction of this interaction strategy successfully delays the extinction of cooperators. And cooperation is enhanced at appropriate aspiration levels but suppressed with high temptations. Moreover, under an appropriate aspiration level, high-payoff cooperators are able to expand the scale of cooperator clusters and low-payoff cooperators maintain the stability of cooperative behaviors by both forming an isolation belt around cooperator clusters and promoting the appearance of high-payoff cooperators, which blocks the invasion of defectors and leads to a state of complete cooperation.