Abstract
In an evolutionary game-theoretical model of tourism firms that use an endogenous natural Common Pool Resource (CPR) we show that stable equilibria with voluntary environmental initiatives may coexist with other equilibria where voluntary abatement is absent. The basins of attraction of the equilibria are identified and a bifurcation analysis is carried out producing two results with policy implications. First, there is a highly non-linear relationship between the cost of abatement required to be green and the share of green firms. Second, increases in the number of the CPR's users will ultimately dissipate the incentives to make abatement beyond regulation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
