Abstract

The interconnectedness of financial institutions affects instability and credit crises. To quantify systemic risk we introduce here the PD model, a dynamic model that combines credit risk techniques with a contagion mechanism on the network of exposures among banks. A potential loss distribution is obtained through a multi-period Monte Carlo simulation that considers the probability of default (PD) of the banks and their tendency of defaulting in the same time interval. A contagion process increases the PD of banks exposed toward distressed counterparties. The systemic risk is measured by statistics of the loss distribution, while the contribution of each node is quantified by the new measures PDRank and PDImpact. We illustrate how the model works on the network of the European Global Systemically Important Banks. For a certain range of the banks’ capital and of their assets volatility, our results reveal the emergence of a strong contagion regime where lower default correlation between banks corresponds to higher losses. This is the opposite of the diversification benefits postulated by standard credit risk models used by banks and regulators who could therefore underestimate the capital needed to overcome a period of crisis, thereby contributing to the financial system instability.

Highlights

  • One lesson learned from the recent credit crisis is that the stability of the financial system cannot be assessed focussing exclusively on each individual bank or financial institution

  • The probability of default (PD) model, can be used by regulators to quantify the systemic risk of a financial network in terms of statistics of a loss distribution in a language that is familiar to financial risk managers

  • The banks can be classified according to their contribution to systemic risk using the measure that we have called PDRank, while the resilience of the financial system to external stress can be estimated with PDImpact

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Summary

Introduction

One lesson learned from the recent credit crisis is that the stability of the financial system cannot be assessed focussing exclusively on each individual bank or financial institution. In particular techniques borrowed from network science[11,12] have been successfully applied to the study of network resilience to external shocks[13,14,15] and have proven useful in the analysis of financial systemic risk[16,17,18,19,20,21] In this context, financial institutions are described as nodes in a network, connected by different kinds of edges, indicating: cross ownership[22], investments in the same set of assets (overlapping portfolios)[23,24,25] or credit exposures (for example loans)[26,27,28,29]. This approach can be used in the financial systemic risk context imagining the financial institutions as a portfolio of risky assets owned by the regulators[30]

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