Abstract
Opportunistic availability of licensed frequency bands enables the secondary users (SUs) to avail the radio spectrum dynamically. Cognitive radio (CR) paradigm extends the dynamic spectrum access techniques to sense for free channels (called spectrum holes) which can be efficiently redistributed amongst SUs. Motivated by the adaptive technology in CR, this paper introduces a sealed-bid double auction mechanism which aims to obtain an effective allocation of the unused radio spectrum. The proposed auction model adopts multi-channel allocation where one SU can access more than one available channel, while imposing the constraints for dynamics in spectrum opportunities and varying channel availability time amongst SUs. Previously designed double auctions miss out the CR constraints which can further degrade the network performance. Also, multi-winner allocation is induced in the model which encourages spectrum reuse by allowing a common channel to be assigned to multiple non-interfering SUs. A preference list of channels is maintained at each SU using which SUs offer their bid values for the heterogeneous channels which the primary owners are competing to lease. To organize channel specific groups of non-interfering SUs, a bidder group formation algorithm is developed such that members of a winner group get access to a common channel. The auctioneer formulates a winner determination strategy and a pricing strategy which achieves truthfulness while assigning the idle spectrum. Effectiveness of the proposed model is studied by comparing it with an existing work which shows that channel allocation gets significantly improved on deploying the proposed model.
Highlights
INTRODUCTIONTraditional static spectrum assignment policy allocates large chunks of spectrum to licensed users (or primary users) on a long term basis
Traditional static spectrum assignment policy allocates large chunks of spectrum to licensed users on a long term basis
To efficiently redistribute the radio resource, Cognitive Radio (CR) uses dynamic spectrum access (DSA) techniques [4] which initially senses for spectrum holes and enables the secondary users (SUs) to opportunistically use the spectrum holes causing no interference to primary users (PUs)
Summary
Traditional static spectrum assignment policy allocates large chunks of spectrum to licensed users (or primary users) on a long term basis. To prevent any market manipulation of the bids and asks, the auction mechanism demands a truthful winner determination algorithm such that no bidder/seller can improve its utility with an untruthful bid/ask Motivated by these observations, we develop a double auction model which includes the discussed network constraints to achieve an effectual spectrum allocation. We propose a multi-channel multi-winner sealed-bid double auction mechanism to model the spectrum allocation problem in CRN. SB acting as the auctioneer collects asks from POs and bids from SUs and decides a clearing price with the winner determination and pricing strategies to achieve an efficient allocation Both multi-channel allocation and multiwinner allocation for spectrum reuse have been applied in this model.
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