Abstract
This paper analyzes a labor market in which workers possess incomplete information about their exchange opportunities. Within this environment workers allocate time to the acquisition of job-related information. Rules are specified determining where workers will seek employment and how firms will vary wages in response to workers' choices. Assuming a change in workers' notional labor supply, the paper then analyzes the dynamics of labor market disequilibrium. Two principal conclusions emerge: (1) Workers' time costs of acquiring information rise during disequilibrium. (2) In general the final wage differs from the wage that would prevail if a Walrasian auctioneer guided the labor market's adjustment.
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