A Direct Object of Perception

Mika Suojanen

doi:10.18267/j.e-logos.411

Abstract

I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both a tree-image and a tree-experience are distinct from a material tree. Perception of an object is caused by human nature, the senses and consciousness, and mind may prevent the direct perception of the external world. The strongest objection against that consequence is that there is no extra entity called sense-datum or appearance between a subject-in-itself and a real external thing-in-itself. That is, we see books, not book-images. The possible reply would be that a person sees no mental pictures except that which they see via pictures.

Highlights

Many medieval and modern philosophers distinguished a mental thing from an external object
Introspection demonstrates that the image of a tree and the perceptual object of a tree share similar content and qualities, from which it logically follows that both are subjective entities which are not outside of a perceiving person
It is impossible to define and understand a perceptual appearance as a three-dimensional body possessing a certain place in space in which we will meet it in a future situation

Summary

Introduction

Many medieval and modern philosophers distinguished a mental thing from an external object. The studies of Stephen Kosslyn (2003, 2005) and Zenon Pylyshyn (2002, 2003) have been especially remarkable These studies have not focused on the ontology of these two phenomena being in relation to a human person and the substance of the external world. There are very good reasons to claim that a mental image and the object of perception are similar entities, they would not be identical. From this claim logically follows a hypothesis that they are distinguished in their nature from the supposed mindindependent entities, and these entities are causal factors in perceiving them but not in visualizing them. I do not infer from the results the non-existence of the external world and the mind-independent objects, as George Berkeley (1734/1996) does

The Object of Perception and the Image are Mind-dependent

Critical Evaluation of the Premises

An Objection and a Reply

Conclusion