A dilemma in rape crisis and a contribution from philosophy

Hane Htut Maung

doi:10.1057/s41599-021-00769-y

Abstract

The notion that rape is an act of violence rather than sex is a central tenet in rape crisis support and education. A therapeutic benefit of this conceptualisation of rape is that it counters shame and guilt by affirming that the victim was not a complicit partner in an act of sex. However, this conceptualisation has recently been criticised for not capturing what makes rape an especially serious kind of wrong. This raises an apparent dilemma for rape crisis support. Recent work in analytic moral philosophy on the nature of rape offers a way to resolve this dilemma. It is argued that rape is not sex, but is nonetheless sexual. This distinction allows for a charitable reformulation of the central tenet in rape crisis support, which can facilitate the dual therapeutic aims of countering the sense of shame and of recognising the especially serious kind of the harm suffered by the victim.

Highlights

Rape is a crime that is associated with serious psychological harm
The sense of guilt is compounded by the traditional assumption that rape is an act of sex, insofar as this alludes that the victim of rape was a complementary partner in an act that carries a lot of personal and moral significance (Donat and D’Emilio, 1992; Freedman, 1987)
According to this traditional assumption, sexual intercourse and rape involve the same kind of act, with the only difference being that consent is present in the former but absent in the latter

Summary

Introduction

Rape is a crime that is associated with serious psychological harm. Victims of rape suffer from higher rates of mental health problems and suicidal behaviours, but often experience intense feelings of shame and guilt (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1980; van Egmond et al, 1993; Vidal and Petrak, 2007). The above raises an apparent dilemma regarding the central tenet in rape crisis support that rape is not an act of sex Accepting this tenet may be beneficial because it counters shame and guilt by affirming that the victim of rape was not a complicit partner in an act of having sex, but is problematic because it does not seem to appreciate the distinctive kind of harm that the victim has suffered. I will largely be drawing on recent work by the philosopher Fiona Woollard (2019), who argues that rape is not sex but is sexual This distinction allows for a qualified acceptance of the central tenet in rape crisis support that rape is not an act of sex, while capturing the key feature of rape that makes it an especially serious kind of wrong.

Background and context

Theoretical and practical implications

Conclusion

Additional information