Abstract

In this paper, I show that David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism leads to a dilemma. In Chapter 2 of his book Better Never to Have Been, Benatar claims that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits that explains four prevalent asymmetries. Based on the axiological asymmetry, he defends the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. The four prevalent asymmetries to be explained are moral duties, reasons, attitudes, or feelings concerning life as a whole. However, Benatar explains them by applying the axiological asymmetry to parts of life, such as pains and pleasures. I find a serious gap here. While two ways are available to bridge this gap, a dilemma arises from Benatar’s asymmetry argument. The axiological asymmetry is not supported because it cannot explain the four prevalent asymmetries, or else it cannot lead to the anti-natalist conclusion. A number of philosophers have already criticized Benatar’s asymmetry argument, mainly questioning its assumptions. In this paper, I contend that there is no good reason to agree with his argument even if all its explicit assumptions are accepted.

Highlights

  • In his much-discussed book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar (2006) argues that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits: while the presence of harm is bad and the absence of harm is good, the presence of benefit is good, but the absence of benefit is not bad unless there exists someone for whom it is a deprivation

  • The axiological asymmetry is not supported if it is applied in this way because it cannot explain the prevalent asymmetries pertaining to life as a whole

  • To mention but a few examples, some claim that the four asymmetries are explained by principles other than the axiological asymmetry (Harman 2009, 781; Bayne 2010, 50–52; Metz 2011, 241–243), and some claim that the asymmetry of procreational duties is problematic

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Summary

Introduction

In his much-discussed book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar (2006) argues that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits: while the presence of harm is bad and the absence of harm is good, the presence of benefit is good, but the absence of benefit is not bad unless there exists someone for whom it is a deprivation. Benatar concludes that coming into existence is always a harm Based on this evaluation, he derives the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. Benatar’s main argument for his axiological asymmetry that leads to such a conclusion invokes its power to explain four prevalent asymmetries, including our asymmetrical duties of procreation, according to which we have a duty to avoid bringing a miserable life into existence but do not have a duty to bring a happy life into existence. One option is to apply, as Benatar does, the axiological asymmetry to parts of life, which leads to the anti-natalist conclusion. The axiological asymmetry is not supported if it is applied in this way because it cannot explain the prevalent asymmetries pertaining to life as a whole. The novel critique that I present cuts to the heart of the structure of Benatar’s asymmetry argument

Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
Gap in Benatar’s Argument
First Horn
Second Horn
Summarizing the Dilemma
Possible Objections and Replies
Order of Evaluation Steps
Asymmetry of Duties
Asymmetry of Reasons
Negative Utilitarianism
Conclusion
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