Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the interactions between the intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) and attackers in wireless networks. We model this interactions as a non-cooperative differential game. In terms of model construction, each node is allowed to choose its optimal cost of resource consumption to contribute to the security problem depending on the state. We derive the optimal strategies for the attackers and the IPSs over time, respectively. Simulation analysis will be given to illustrate that the dynamic evolution of the defense strategy of the IPSs and the trajectory of the attackers based on the proposed scheme.
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