A differential game model for marine ranching development decisions between government and marine ranching enterprises considering myopic behavior

Abstract

Government and marine ranching enterprises play decisive roles in promoting the sustainable development of marine ranching. The decisions made by these entities, whether short-sighted or far-sighted, can significantly impact the industry. This study proposes a differential game model to systematically examine the dynamic decision-making processes of both entities in promoting the development of marine ranching, considering their distinct behavioral strategies. This study helped in determining the optimal strategy for subsidy, the government’s promotional decisions, and the best development strategy for the enterprise. This study also uses Yantai marine ranching in Shandong Province as a case study. The findings suggest that government subsidy measures serve as an effective intervention to incentivize enterprises and boost market demand, regardless of short-sighted decisions by enterprises. However, short-sighted behavior by both the government and enterprises could negatively affect the goodwill and market demand for marine ranching products, thereby impeding the sustainable development of marine ranching. Moreover, the government’s decisions on a subsidy strategy for enterprises are based on external conditions. The study findings can offer valuable guidance for developing marine ranching.