A differential game approach for real-time security defense decision in scale-free networks

Abstract

The current network security defense decision method is based on the principle of attack–defense confrontation and generally uses a random network model to project the real network. Most of the existing complex network defense decision methods consider a single defender while ignoring the confrontation and dependence between network attack and defense behaviors. In addition, the pertinence and dynamics of the defense effect are also insufficient. This article comprehensively considers the structure of a scale-free network and characteristics of network attack and defense behavior and combines a complex network with differential game theory to study the real-time defense decision problem. First, a propagation model based on a scale-free network is designed to realize the real-time fluctuation analysis of a network security state. Then, the attack and defense strategy are described, and the calculation method of revenue based on the confrontation analysis of the attack and defense behavior and a change in the security state of the network nodes based on the saddle point equilibrium strategy are introduced. Finally, based on the average connection degree of the real word Internet, a simulated network is constructed to conduct experiments. By comparison with random defense strategies and several typical complex network defense decision methods, the effectiveness and advancement of the proposed method are verified.