A different view of metamemory with illustrations from children’s beliefs about long-term retention

Abstract

We argue that metamemory has traditionally been conceptualized as factual, truthful knowledge about memory. We suggest that such a conceptualization is overly restrictive, theoretically and empirically, and propose that metamemory should be conceptualized as personalized, constructed knowledge consisting of both accurate and naive beliefs. Using data concerning the development of children’s beliefs about long-term retention, we illustrate the advantages of this more contemporary conceptualization over its traditional counterpart. These advantages are that the contemporary view (a) places considerable value on young children’s beliefs, many of which are naive, and their role in development, (b) encourages metamemory research in areas where it is not known a priori what the accurate metamemory belief should be, (c) helps to make contact with the literature on theories of the mind, and (d) is consistent with contemporary theories of knowledge development in general. We elaborate the contemporary view of metamemory, outlining a model of how it develops and how it impacts on memory. We conclude by sketching some future directions for research in the area.