Abstract
A Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu kind of characterization is found for positional voting procedures. Namely, for n⩾2 candidates, once the voting procedures and a profile are specified, the rankings of all possible subsets of candidates are uniquely determined. By varying over all profiles, one obtains a dictionary of all possible coordinated election outcomes. This is done for all positional voting procedures. As with excess demand functions, anything can happen; voting paradoxes can be very complicated. Only Borda's method avoids many paradoxes. Use of this dictionary is illustrated by significantly extending several well-known paradoxes and by obtaining new results about runoff and agenda elections, strategic behavior, etc.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
