A Definição Tradicional do Conhecimento

Abstract

The search for a correct definition of propositional knowledge took place in the second half of the last Century. In this paper, I wish to submit an introduction to the topic. I start by offering basic notions of belief, truth and epistemic justification. Then I use those basic notions to shed some light over the nature of the so called Traditional Definition of Knowledge (TDC). I do that by focusing on those which, by my own lights, seem to be the most salient historical events and philosophical views canvassing the issue of the TDC on that period of time; crucially, I pay close attention to the arguments submitted by Edmund Gettier against the sufficiency of the TDC, keeping in mind that nowadays almost everybody concurs that those arguments falsify it. The article also offers a brief taxonomy of the possible answers to the so-called Gettier Problem and describes the most recent developments on this debate.