A decisive factor? Pro-government external interventions in civil wars

Abstract

Civil wars have been the most prevalent type of armed conflicts post-World War II. Despite the internal nature of such conflicts, foreign assistance is frequently provided to one of the parties involved, with official governments being the most frequent beneficiaries. This study employs extensive empirical evidence to analyze how external involvement in support of government forces influences the outcome of civil wars. Drawing on the bargaining model of war, a civil war is portrayed as a continuous process where the parties constantly reassess their chances of success based on individual battle outcomes. One-sided foreign intervention complicates this evaluation by exacerbating power and information asymmetries inherent to internal conflicts, leading to increased uncertainty about the opponent’s capabilities and intentions, as well as doubts about their ability to credibly commit to peace agreements. Using Cox proportional hazards model, the author finds that external pro-government support primarily serves to sustain the recipient’s ability to continue fighting rather than significantly enhance its chances of victory in a civil war. Furthermore, the impact of such support varies depending on the type of intervention: indirect assistance is associated with a reduced likelihood of the opposition prevailing, whereas direct military intervention does not have a statistically significant influence on the outcome.