Abstract
Since 2009 when Boko Haram launched its first attack in Nigeria, the terrorist sect has remained a significant security and economic threat to the countries of the Lake Chad region. While moderate successes were recorded between 2015 and 2016, with the government maintaining that the insurgent sect has been technically defeated, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Using the historical approach as its research methodology, this paper analyses the factors responsible for the sect’s resurgence, and Nigeria’s response. It argues that Nigeria’s failure to nip the insurgency in the bud is attributable to two main factors: the emergence, growing, and unchecked influence of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISAWP) in the Lake Chad region, and the unresolved ill-equipped state of the Nigerian military. The paper submits that any serious attempt aimed at arresting this trend must begin by addressing these issues.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
