Abstract
This article presents a new data set on individual choices in the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auctions, collected in a lab experiment reported in “An Experimental Study of the Generalized Second Price Auction” [1]. 108 subjects were recruited and asked to submit bids in a sequence of GSP auctions, which were computerized, programmed using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects were incentivized to submit bids to (in expectation) maximize the profit in the GSP auctions as we paid cash proportional to the profit earned in the experiment. The experiment simulated GSP auctions where three bidders compete for two advertisement-slots. Two sets of Click-Through Rates (11-10, 11-3) were employed under both static complete information and dynamic incomplete information.
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