Abstract
Due to recent increase in deployment of Cyber-Physical Industrial Control Systems in different critical infrastructures, addressing cyber-security challenges of these systems is vital for assuring their reliability and secure operation in presence of malicious cyber attacks. Towards this end, developing a testbed to generate real-time data-sets for critical infrastructure that would be utilized for validation of real-time attack detection algorithms are indeed highly needed. This paper investigates and proposes the design and implementation of a cyber-physical industrial control system testbed where the Tennessee Eastman process is simulated in real-time on a PC and the closed-loop controllers are implemented on the Siemens PLCs. False data injection cyber attacks are injected to the developed testbed through the man-in-the-middle structure where the malicious hackers can in real-time modify the sensor measurements that are sent to the PLCs. Furthermore, various cyber attack detection algorithms are developed and implemented in real-time on the testbed and their performance and capabilities are compared and evaluated.
Highlights
Recent technological advances in control, computing, and communications have generated intense interest in development of new generation of highly interconnected and sensor rich systems that is known as critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) infrastructure with application to variety of engineering domains such as process and automation systems, smart grid and smart cities, and healthcare systems
All communications between the distributed I/O modules and PLCs are based on the PROFINET protocol which is an Open Real-time Industrial Ethernet Standard Protocol which can be used for virtually any function that is required in automation, namely: discrete, process, motion, peer-to-peer integration, vertical integration, and safety, among others
Real-time data through the man-in-the-middle (MITM) structure is validated on the developed testbed. This is mainly achieved by utilizing the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in which the port of the victim on the shared medium is stolen and the hacker acts as a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) in the closed-loop system that can modify the sensor measurements that are sent to the PLC
Summary
Recent technological advances in control, computing, and communications have generated intense interest in development of new generation of highly interconnected and sensor rich systems that is known as critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) infrastructure with application to variety of engineering domains such as process and automation systems, smart grid and smart cities, and healthcare systems. Various real-time online cyber attack detection algorithms are developed and implemented on the testbed and their performance capabilities are compared and evaluated This is the first work in the literature that completely simulates a full-version of the Tennessee Eastman Process using a hybrid testbed. This work provides a comprehensive solution for the cyber-security of ICS enabled with the following main contributions: 1) A hybrid testbed is developed by using the simulated full-version of the Tennessee Eastman Process as a nonlinear unstable process and the Siemens field devices such as PLC and distributed I/O, whereas the previous work in [29], [30] only considered the simplified version of TE without having any actual hardware in the testbed.
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