Abstract

In spite of being just a few years old, ransomware is quickly becoming a serious threat to our digital infrastructures, data and services. Majority of ransomware families are requesting for a ransom payment to restore a custodian access or decrypt data which were encrypted by the ransomware earlier. Although the ransomware attack strategy seems to be simple, security specialists ranked ransomware as a sophisticated attack vector with many variations and families. Wide range of features which are available in different families and versions of ransomware further complicates their detection and analysis. Though the existing body of research provides significant discussions about ransomware details and capabilities, the all research body is fragmented. Therefore, a ransomware feature taxonomy would advance cyber defenders’ understanding of associated risks of ransomware. In this paper we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first scientific taxonomy of ransomware features, aligned with Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) model. CKC is a well-established model in industry that describes stages of cyber intrusion attempts. To ease the challenge of applying our taxonomy in real world, we also provide the corresponding ransomware defence taxonomy aligned with Courses of Action matrix (an intelligence-driven defence model). We believe that this research study is of high value for the cyber security research community, as it provides the researchers with a means of assessing the vulnerabilities and attack vectors towards the intended victims.

Highlights

  • The fast growth in both number and types made ransomware an imminent threat to our digital data [1]

  • They use a range of techniques from disguising a malware in a benign looking payload, such as Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents, to exploiting a remote-access O-day vulnerability2 to disable target machine security protections, such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) or AntiViruses [25]

  • While there are some similarities between these related work and our features taxonomy, there are two main differences: (i) as ransomware has specific objective, we distinguish and provide features dedicated to ransomware; and (ii) our taxonomy is systematized based on Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) framework which makes it easier for cyber defenders to use it as a reference for standard defensive and process models, e.g., Courses of Action (CoA) Matrix [20], that are well-known and well-established within the operations of many organizations

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Summary

Introduction

The fast growth in both number and types made ransomware an imminent threat to our digital data [1]. A comprehensive taxonomy would help in differentiating between a ransomware and other malware samples, classifying different ransomware families based on their known features and providing dedicated course of actions to each category. This motivated us to provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first taxonomy of ransomware features To this end, we provide the reader with detailed information about ransomware lifecycle; enabling researchers to figure out how a criminal delivers a ransomware (considering different families) and infects a victim, how ransomware hides itself, as well as the actions that ransomware performs on the victim’s machine. If the victim decides to make the ransom payment, occasionally ransomware continues with downloading the decryption key from the C&C server and decrypts the victim data ( in the absence of follow-up security improvements it is just matter of time that the same or different ransomware infects the machine again). 1: Victim receives a phishing email containing a link to an infected website, and visits the website

11.2: The decryption key will be destroyed
Background on Cyber Kill Chain and Courses of Actions Matrix
Encryption Method Diversification
Ransomware features taxonomy
Weaponization
Script-based ransomware
Delivery payload diversification
Diversifying file access patterns
Diversifying data encryption methods
Evasion techniques
Social engineering
Malvertisement
Traffic distribution system
Exploit kits
Targeted exploitation
Installation
Installation on the infected host
Installation on the infected network
Actions on objectives
Ransomware defence overview
Related work
Conclusion and future work
21. Ransomware on the rise
Findings
36. From rar to javascript

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