Abstract

Spectrum sensing is the prerequisite of the realization of cognitive radio. So it is a significant part of cognitive radio. In order to stimulate the SUs to sense the spectrum, we combine the incentive mechanism of crowd-sensing with cooperative spectrum sensing effectively, and put forward a crowd cooperative spectrum sensing algorithm with optimal utility of secondary users (SUs) under non-ideal channel which we define SUs’ utility expectation functions related to rewards, sensing time and transmission power. Then, we construct the optimization problem of maximizing the utilities of SUs by optimizing the sensing time and the transmission power, and prove that this problem is a convex optimization problem. The optimal sensing time and transmission power are obtained by using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The numerical simulation results show that the spectrum detection performance of algorithm, which we put forward, is improved.

Highlights

  • In recent years, mobile data services have developed rapidly, and the demand for wireless spectrum resources is growing

  • Spectrum sensing, which is an important part of cognitive radio, is aimed to sense whether the primary user (PU) occupies a specific frequency spectrum resource at a specific time in a particular location

  • Under non-ideal channel, we propose a system model which combines crowd sensing incentive mechanism with cooperative spectrum sensing, and define secondary users (SUs)’s utility expectation function which considers the SUs’ sensing time and transmission power at the same time

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Mobile data services have developed rapidly, and the demand for wireless spectrum resources is growing. In [19], the task assignment problem of sensitive service quality is studied, the rewards of participants are related to the quality of sensing data. In order to stimulate the SUs to take part in the cooperative spectrum sensing, we need to combine the crowd sensing incentive mechanism with the cooperative spectrum sensing. Under non-ideal channel, we propose a system model which combines crowd sensing incentive mechanism with cooperative spectrum sensing, and define SU’s utility expectation function which considers the SUs’ sensing time and transmission power at the same time.

System Model
Utility Optimal Algorithm
Computer Simulations
Conclusions
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.