Abstract
With the advent of the era of “New Retail”, many manufacturers and retailers have begun to provide cross-channel return services to increase competitiveness. Our study takes return policy into a green dual-channel supply chain, wherein a manufacturer creates and sells green products simultaneously. We investigate the pricing and greening strategies for the supply chain players in the cases of providing and not providing cross-channel return service by employing the Stackelberg model under the hypothesis of a consistent pricing strategy. By comparing the equilibrium results of two cases, we find that the retailer will cooperate with the manufacturer to employ the cross-channel return policy when the spillover effect is greater than a threshold. Additionally, the green level of products is higher than before. The threshold decreases with consumers’ sensitivity to green products, which implies that the manufacturer is motivated to conduct marketing programs to enhance consumers’ willingness to buy green products. Moreover, we propose a contract to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we discuss the scenarios if the supply chain implements a differential pricing strategy. Interestingly, the green level and the profits of the whole supply chain are greater than that under a consistent pricing strategy. However, the profits of the retailer are lower than profits in the other scenario, which is not beneficial to creating a stable green supply chain.
Highlights
With the advent of the era of “New Retail”, online retailers are competing over returns
We examine a coordination model for the dual-channel green supply chain with a cross-channel return policy to achieve a “win-win” scenario
We mainly reviewed literature related to green manufacturing in this part
Summary
With the advent of the era of “New Retail”, online retailers are competing over returns. We take the cross-channel return policy into account when the supply chain produces and sells green products. To the best of our knowledge, no researcher has investigated the green supply chain with a cross-channel return policy and has determined the impact of the return policy on the green level of products yet. Our study combines the DCSC, consumer return, and green manufacturing and investigates the difference between same-channel returns and cross-channel returns under a green supply chain. The cross-channel return policy, as a competitive strategy, can encourage consumers to purchase products. To solve these questions, we apply the Stackelberg game model to investigate the dual-channel green supply chain implementing different return policies. We examine a coordination model for the dual-channel green supply chain with a cross-channel return policy to achieve a “win-win” scenario.
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