A critique of the microfoundations of macroeconomic policy models

Abstract

The contemporary economic debate is focused mainly on the causes and cures of stagflation. There are three major macroeconomic parties to this debate: Incentivists (supply siders), Keynesians, and Monetarists. Each of these schools prepares policy forecasts promoting the merits of its particular remedies for countering stagflation. Though the models driving these forecasts are different in terms of the determinants they emphasize and the economic casuality they invoke, all are predicated on the same set of microeconomic assumptions: those organized under the neoclassical theory of the firm. The fact that the Incentivist, Keynesian, and Monetarist models all share the same microfoundation pretty much eliminates the firm and its properties from the arena of argument. From the standpoint to be developed in this article, this omission is unfortunate, as contemporary enterprises bear increasingly little resemblance to their neoclassical predecessors. The disparities are particularly important in two respects. First, increases in organizational size and complexity mark modern firms as increasingly susceptible to certain inefficiencies that ultimately affect aggregate economic performance adversely. But the mainstream macroeconomic models do not comprehend microeconomic stimuli to stagflation and therefore cannot presume to control them. The result is perhaps a consistent understatement of the reparative task the Incentivists, Keynesians, and Monetarists are promoting for themselves. Second, modern firms entail a potential for autonomous activities that is a priori denied neoclassical enterprises. Increases in autonomy imply some unresponsiveness to exogenous controls of the type the mainstream schools propose to employ as means of restoring economic integrity. To this extent, their policy models may be uniformly overstating the effect their instruments can enjoy in the present economic context. When the likelihood of underestimating the magnitude of the stagflationary problem is coupled with the probable overestimation of interventionist capabilities, the policy forecasts of the Incentivist, Keynesian, and Monetarist schools may be suspected of a degree of optimism entirely unwarranted by current microeconomic realities.