Abstract
This paper presents an unspoken aspect of Head of State immunity, namely that such immunity is at odds with the expectation that international law should be applied to challenge resistance to and promote respect for human rights. It considers the question of whether Head of State immunity gives rise to de facto impunity in the case of violations of human rights recognised as peremptory norms (jus cogens) committed by such Heads of State. While this paper emphasises the critical role of Head of State immunity in the context of international relations, it argues that Heads of State should not exempt from punishment when violations of those human rights are at stake.
Highlights
State officials have traditionally been immune from the jurisdiction of foreign States’ courts when they would otherwise be required to account for the deeds they are accused of committing
This paper presents an unspoken aspect of Head of State immunity, namely that such immunity is at odds with the expectation that international law should be applied to challenge resistance to and promote respect for human rights
While this paper emphasises the critical role of Head of State immunity in the context of international relations, it argues that Heads of State should not exempt from punishment when violations of those human rights are at stake
Summary
State officials have traditionally been immune from the jurisdiction of foreign States’ courts when they would otherwise be required to account for the deeds they are accused of committing. This paper examines the tension between the principle of Head of State immunity and the protection of human rights recognised as peremptory norms under general international law. It considers the developments under international law in respect of the rules regarding such immunity. This paper subsequently discusses and analyses immunity and impunity for Heads of State when violations of human rights recognised as peremptory norms are perpetrated To engage with this discussion, the paper concentrates on the judgement of the International Court of Justice in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) so as to criticise the issue of immunity in question. Regarding the language of this paper, when the phrase fundamental human rights is used, it signifies or reads as human rights recognised as peremptory norms of general international law.
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