A Critique of Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology

Abstract

This paper aims to address the question of whether theistic belief could be rational without propositional evidence or any support by argument. In a series of articles, Plantinga argues that the theist is rationally justified in believing in God without much further evidence. His method is first to criticize classical foundationalism. After showing its inadequacy, he then identifies certain immediate non-inferential beliefs which most persons would agree are reasonable to hold. Having established the reasonableness of such beliefs, he claims that religious beliefs are analogous to such commonly held nontheistic beliefs. I wish to examine Plantinga’s claim that belief in God is properly basic within some non-classical version of foundationalism. First, the basic theory of Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology shall be laid out. Then, I argue that his position is untenable as the method given by his account for demarcating proper and improper basic beliefs raises some difficulties. It is my contention that there are significant differences between theistic beliefs and properly basic nontheistic beliefs and so I question the legitimacy of asserting the proper basicality of theistic beliefs. Thus, Plantinga’s central claim that theistic beliefs have the same epistemic status as other more commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs would be flawed. I also argue that Plantinga’s account of criteria for proper basicality is not consistent.