A criticism of the notions of Nwansa and Nwanju in the conversational approach to African philosophy

Abstract

This paper undertakes a critical exposé of the nature of the notions of Nwansa and Nwanju in the conversational approach to African philosophy. Conversational thinking is a philosophical method that allows individual thinkers to engage with each other philosophically on phenomenological issues. It is a formal, intellectual exercise orchestrated by philosophical reasoning in which critical and rigorous questioning creatively unveils new concepts from old ones. I reveal the limitations of this approach as articulated by Jonathan Chimakonam in his contribution to the methodological issues in African philosophy. In doing so, I demonstrate that these limitations are present, in part, in Chimakonam's unclear distinction between conversationalism on the one hand, and Socratic-Hegelian dialectics on the other hand. I also show that Chimakonam's claim that the engagement between Nwansa and Nwanju in conversational relationship does not result in a synthesis but, rather, perpetuates the reshuffling of thesis and anti-thesis, raises questions on the conversational nature of conversationalism, and poses a challenge when applied to existential situations. I argue that conversational philosophy should be perceived as a reconstruction of Socratic-Hegelian Dialectics or a tacit improvement of it. For this reason, I conclude that despite its limitations, a conversational approach through the dynamics of Nwansa and Nwanju is still significant in the development of contemporary African philosophy and in the management of some ideological issues confronting the African philosophical project.