Abstract

In 1993, the Canadian federal government ratified the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Prior to ratification, compulsory licensing was eliminated from Canada's Patent Act and intellectual property rights (IPRs) were strengthened. Compulsory licensing allows competitors to produce drugs under patent without the consent of the patent holder, challenging drug monopolies and lowering prices, whereas IPRs lengthen patent protections, shielding patent holders from competition and increasing prices. We perform a critical discourse analysis of key provisions in Chapter 17 of NAFTA in light of industry claims that pharmaceutical innovation requires important investments in research and development, justifying high drug prices. We note that since NAFTA, spending in research and development in Canada has decreased and drug prices have increased, becoming a major barrier to equitable access to critically necessary medications. We argue that by modifying the law, the federal government has wronged the Canadian people by discursively appropriating the language of protecting the public good while in practice legitimizing and consolidating private drug development and production, legalizing exorbitant profits, and excluding well-tested publicly financed alternatives. While NAFTA has now been superseded by the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, our analysis offers important lessons moving forward.

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