A Critical Assessment of Using Children to Participate Actively in Hostilities in Lubanga Child Soldiers and Direct Participation

Abstract

The first judgment of the International Criminal Court, delivered on 9 March 2012, raises a pivotal and equally controversial issue of what constitutes ‘active participation in hostilities’ for the purpose of the child solider offences under the Rome Statute in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The Majority (Judge Fulford and Judge Blattmann) adopted a broad definition of the notion of ‘active’ participation and the Minority (Judge Benito) an even more ample one. This was achieved by distinguishing between ‘active participation in hostilities’ and ‘direct participation in hostilities’ and by recourse to the travaux preparatoires of the Rome Statute and to human rights norms. The purpose of this contribution is to demonstrate that the meaning of ‘active participation in hostilities’ under Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute is not ambiguous or obscure, but is the same as that of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ under international humanitarian law. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation by the Trial Chamber, be it to the travaux preparatoires, or to human rights norms, was unnecessary and misguided. The contribution will also draw some conclusions on how criminal liability before the ICC may be excluded for Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) or 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute on the basis of the broad definition adopted by the Trial Chamber of the notion of ‘active participation in hostilities’ and will discuss other consequences arising from the judgement at hand.