Abstract

Rawls' theory of public reason provides ample scope for criticism. While its author laudably attempts to ensure a level of civility and respect in public discourse, with no comprehensive doctrine favoured over any other, these aims are counteracted by the theory's fundamental weaknesses. George succeeds in highlighting many of these. However, he also fails to accurately evaluate some of Rawls' ideas, thereby preventing him from answering them persuasively. Finally, his assessment is not systematic or comprehensive, leaving out several significant criticisms that have subsequently been highlighted by other thinkers. Most importantly, he points out – but does not explain – the tendency of public reason to favour secularism. It is this secular bias that could prove to be Rawls' most damaging legacy.

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