A Critical Analysis of Usual Authority in Agency Contracts

Abstract

The nature of usual authority has been on focus and, in fact, has occasioned much debate in the law of agency particularly as a result of unfolding arguments relating to its scope. The fundamental point is whether usual authority emanates from the other known types of authority an agent may possess in order to effectively represent a principal. Again, it is unsettled whether usual authority can exist in its own independent right as a category of authority. This article attempts a critical analysis on usual authority based on a review of a plethora of decided cases. In particular, the locus classicus case of Watteau v. Fenwick is examined and further analysed in the light of the legal views of judges, scholars and several commentators and cases subsequently decided; all of which attempt to uncover when a principal can be held liable for the acts of an agent that are customary to the particular position occupied by the agent.