A Critical Analysis of the Self‐determination of Peoples: A Cosmopolitan Perspective

Abstract

Over the last few years, the demand for the self-determination of peoples has once more acquired considerable force. In consolidated states no less than in states that are falling apart, more or less dominant political groups have appealed to self-determination to support their own political projects. Statistics on the issue tell us that at the beginning of 2003 there are 22 ongoing armed conflicts for self-determination, 51 groups using conventional political means to pursue selfdetermination, and 29 groups using militant strategies short of armed violence. 1 Such demands have pursued a variety of goals, ranging from multilinguism to greater tolerance for the religions, habits, and customs of minorities, and even the review of borders and the setting up of new states. Different, often contradictory aspirations have thus been grouped under the single banner of self-determination. If we take a closer look at such demands, we find that “the right to selfdetermination” spans three very different categories. The first is the selfdetermination of colonial peoples, which is how the term is used in the United Nations Charter and in many other sources of international law. The entire world political community supports this meaning, bar a few exceptions. The second meaning, associated with secession, encompasses the demands of minorities which intend to break away from the state they belong to, and has been the most in vogue since the end of the Cold War and also the one most directly associated with the armed conflicts and civil wars of the last decade. It is the second meaning, in particular, that clashes with the concept of state sovereignty. The third meaning, finally, refers to certain ethnic or cultural groups which, although intending to remain part of the state they belong to, wish to achieve certain collective rights. This latter is the most innovative meaning and, in democratic states especially, has triggered a fierce debate. Albeit all theoretically and politically valid, the three meanings hide political and intellectual pitfalls. In all three, self-determination is a subjective right which fails as yet to be precisely matched by a body of law. The thesis I argue here is that to be put into full effect, the right to self-determination cannot be selfassessed by conflicting political communities. If it is, the outcome will likely reflect the power of the contending parties rather than the interest of the peoples. In order to retain its validity, the concept of self-determination should be fitted