Abstract
Differential power analysis (DPA) is an effective side channel attack method, which poses a critical threat to cryptographic algorithms, especially lightweight ciphers such as SIMON. In this paper, we propose an area-efficient countermeasure against DPA on SIMON based on the power randomization. Firstly, we review and analyze the architecture of SIMON algorithm. Secondly, we prove the threat of DPA attack to SIMON by launching actual DPA attack on SIMON 32/64 circuit. Thirdly, a low-cost power randomization scheme is proposed by combining fault injection with double rate technology, and the corresponding circuit design is implemented. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that applies the combination of fault injection and double rate technology to the DPA-resistance. Finally, the t-test is used to evaluate the security mechanism of the proposed designs with leakage quantification. Our experimental results show that the proposed design implements DPA-resistance of SIMON algorithm at certain overhead the cost of 47.7% LUTs utilization and 39.6% registers consumption. As compared to threshold implementation and bool mask, the proposed scheme has greater advantages in resource consumption.
Highlights
Differential power analysis (DPA) is a typical side channel attack method that performs a correlation analysis by collecting the dynamic power consumption of the operation
SIMON algorithm is a lightweight block cryptographic algorithm proposed by the National
We propose a compact countermeasure against DPA attack on SIMON by using power randomization method
Summary
Differential power analysis (DPA) is a typical side channel attack method that performs a correlation analysis by collecting the dynamic power consumption of the operation. We propose a compact countermeasure against DPA attack on SIMON by using power randomization method. In order to reduce the consumption of additional resources, a power randomization design scheme based on fault injection and double rate technology is proposed in this paper. Compared with existing countermeasure based on the threshold implementation and bool mask [2,6,11], our scheme is area-efficient The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces SIMON algorithm in detail. In order to reduce the circuit area, we propose a power randomization scheme based on random fault injection and double rate technology. We detail the design of the fault injection circuit, the double rate circuit, and the random bit generator, and give the resource consumption of the designed anti-DPA SIMON circuit under the Xilinx xc7k160tffg-1 FPGA.
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