A coordination mechanism for supply chains with capacity expansions and order-dependent lead times

Abstract

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a retailer for short life cycle products facing stochastic customer demand and a manufacturer that initiates production upon receipt of retail orders. Departing from the common view of the newsvendor problem, we assume that the delivery lead time is not fixed, but that both the retailer and the manufacturer have the option to shorten it. Shorter lead times enable the retailer to place orders closer to the start of the selling season where additional information on customer preferences has become available, reducing demand uncertainty. In the work at hand, lead time is assumed to depend on the order quantity, on the supplier's production capacity, and a fixed transportation delay. This paper proposes a model for determining the optimal order quantity and production capacity in centralized and decentralized settings. For the uncoordinated case, we show that if the retailer's ability to gather and analyze additional demand information is revealed to the manufacturer, the arising information asymmetry between the two parties can aggravate the double marginalization effect and, in turn, erode supply chain efficiency. In a coordinated supply chain, however, both parties have an incentive to align both order quantity and investments in lead time reduction. To coordinate the decentralized supply chain, we propose a buy-back contract that helps to leverage supply chain profitability. We conclude with an outlook on future research opportunities.