A coordinated scheme of electricity-gas systems and impacts of a gas system FDI attacks on electricity system

Abstract

The increased penetration of natural gas-fired generation units in electricity systems calls for coordination of natural gas and electricity systems. Moreover, concerns over security of coordinated gas-electricity systems are spreading in recent years. Notably, both energy systems are vulnerable to malicious cyber-attacks. Within this context, this article (1) proposes a coordination scheme for the day-ahead schedule of natural gas and electricity systems; (2) defines a new class of false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on the gas demand and scheduling information of the natural gas system; and (3) investigates the impacts of such attacks on the operation of both energy systems. The coordination mechanism consists of three nested optimization problems. The natural gas system scheduling step in the mechanism is modeled as a bi-level max–min optimization problem with consideration of attacks. We use a column and constraint generation (C&CG) algorithm to solve this bi-level problem. The coordination mechanism and bi-level attack problem are examined using a case study based on the IEEE 24-node test system and a 9-node gas system, as well as a case study based on the IEEE 118-node test system and a 25-node gas system.