A cooperative detection and compensation mechanism against Denial-of-Service attack for cyber-physical systems

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the detection and compensation co-design issue for cyber-physical systems against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. First, a novel supervisory strategy is proposed based on the concept of packet reception rate, which can detect the behavior of a DoS attacker during a given time window. A quantitative description of the relationship among attack times, time window, attack success rate and packet reception rate is analyzed. Based on the attack detection information, the current state under attack can be successfully reconstructed by some past available states. Then, a co-design compensation mechanism is also obtained, which can further guarantee the attacked system is stochastically stable (without the zero-mean Gaussian white noise) or mean square exponentially ultimately bounded (with the zero-mean Gaussian white noise). The corresponding design conditions are derived in terms of linear matrix inequalities. Finally, a numerical example and a practical example are given to show the effectiveness and superiority of the presented design method.