Abstract
This paper proposes a cooperative demand response strategy to reduce the electricity costs in electric distribution networks. Using the Cartel mechanism and repeated games, a punishment rule is established to avoid the non-cooperative behaviors of electric consumers. Specifically, the energy provider forces the consumers to quit cooperation if the real-time price exceeds a threshold price. Also, we consider the forecast errors in the demand response formulation and study the robustness of the system. Numerical results show that the cooperative demand response strategy can prevent selfish consumers from deviating the cooperation and reduce the total electricity costs.
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