A converging non-cooperative [formula omitted] cooperative game theory approach for stabilizing peer-to-peer electricity trading

Abstract

P2P electricity trading is a promising new approach, which achieves a higher level of satisfaction for prosumers and consumers, and reduces the amount of line losses in smart-grid. However, uncertainties in demand and supply of energy may result in contract instability for prosumers and consumers in P2P market. This paper proposes a framework which incorporates both non-cooperative and cooperative game, to facilitate the P2P electricity trading while maintaining stability of the contract. The proposed cooperative game ensures the survival of small-scale prosumers at a risk of market-exit when they do not own enough surplus electricity to cater the power needs of a single consumer. Hence the stability of the contract can be guaranteed. In the proposed approach, a pivotal player is identified with the concept of Shapely-Shubik power index, to distribute the shared revenue in a fair manner. An IEEE 14-bus system, which includes total 22 players (11 prosumers and 11 consumers), is used to test the effectiveness of the proposed approach. One year of dataset is tested and it is shown that both prosumers and consumers can get benefit from the P2P electricity trading while maintaining the stability of the market.