A contextualist semantics for aesthetic judgments

Abstract

In this paper, we present and defend a modest anti-realist conception of aesthetic properties – e.g. being unified, moving, delicate, tragic, etc – in order to motivate a contextualist semantic view about aesthetic judgments. We argue that aesthetic properties are plausibly seen as viewpoint-dependent even though our epistemic access to the presence of aesthetic properties is decidedly more complicated than other, less controversial instances of viewpoint-dependent properties (e.g. personal taste properties). On the basis of our anti-realist conception, we argue, utilizing the Kaplanian distinction between character and content within a possible worlds semantic theory, that the contents expressed in aesthetic thought and language are sensitive to certain contextual features of a particular thinker’s or speaker’s situation. Finally, we address a number of formidable objections to our view, objections concerning certain context-sensitivity diagnostics (about disagreement data in particular), and show how our own brand of contextualism can handle all such objections and thus meet all of the relevant explanatory burdens.