Abstract
Condorcet's principle of choosing the majority alternative whenever one exists is violated not only by Borda's rule but also by any scoring method; nevertheless, the essential property of scoring functions -- consistency of the outcome under aggregation of subgroups -- is shown to be compatible with Condorcet's principle. Moreover, these two properties, suitably interpreted, together with neutrality and the Pareto property, determine a unique rule known as Kemeny's rule.
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