A Consequence-Informed Licensing Path Selection for the Design of Physical Protection Systems at Commercial Nuclear Power Facilities

Abstract

The survivability of the domestic nuclear power industry depends on the cost-competitiveness of safe and secure nuclear power generation. Advanced reactor design concepts aim to have increased safety margins over traditional large light water reactors (LWRs). With increased safety margins comes the potential for a corresponding decrease in off-site risk to the general public from a hypothetical release of radioactivity due to sabotage or theft. Without sacrificing safety or security, advanced reactor designers may be able to achieve operational cost improvements over current LWRs in part by designing less burdensome physical protection systems (PPSs) and by replacing on-site response forces with off-site response forces. To accommodate these developments, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is drafting new rulemakings for physical security when licensing through the current frameworks in 10 CFR 50 or 10 CFR 52 along with drafting an entirely new licensing framework: 10 CFR 53. A novel technology-inclusive consequence-informed methodology for the selection of the optimal licensing path for the design of PPSs at advanced fixed-site commercial nuclear power facilities is presented herein. This methodology proposes integrating security considerations at the beginning of a reactor facility design effort to streamline the licensing process. Off-site total effective dose equivalents at the exclusion area and low population zone boundaries were identified as the key metrics when determining a design’s most appropriate licensing path that in turn affects the design requirements placed upon the PPS. Given these metrics, source-term generation of potential adversary-induced physics-based sabotage actions utilizing severe accident modeling software and off-site plume dispersal modeling were identified as appropriate for determining siting constraints, potential target sets for hypothetical sabotage events, and their subsequent off-site dose consequences. The methodology proposes using the consequence results from the sabotage modeling, in combination with desired cost-saving PPS characteristics, to help inform the licensing path selection. Once a licensing path is chosen, the methodology utilizes the Design and Evaluation Process Outline to evaluate an effective PPS following the licensing requirements placed on the facility. This paper also presents examples of hypothetical commercial nuclear power facilities with varying consequence levels and demonstrations of how to select the optimal licensing pathways for each.