Abstract

A consensus rewarding protocol compensates decentralized miners for participating in the block mining process. Existing consensus mechanisms are always composed of elaborate mining protocols with simply fixed rewarding halved every four years and voluntary transaction fees. However, with the increasing proportion of free packaging transaction fees, strategic miners can entice others miners to follow their blocks by leaving more transaction fees, so as to obtain benefits and subvert the whole chain. This study presents a contract theory-based consensus rewarding protocol to prevent such behavior by considering two dimensional types of miners: relative hash rate and transaction fee preference. The utility of both miners and blockchain system are formulated considering TPS miner provided and corresponding rewards. The real transaction data of Bitcoin is used to carry out the experimental simulation, and the results show that our proposed incentive mechanism effectively prevents miners’ strategic behavior and improves system utility.

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