‘A Conquerable Yet Resilient Foe’: British Perceptions of the Imperial Japanese Army's Tactics on the India-Burma Front, September 1942 to Summer 1944

Abstract

Britain's ability to discard its image of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) as an invincible enemy during the Burma campaign hinged upon two key factors. First, accurate assessments of the appropriate means to overcome the IJA not only hinged upon reliable intelligence, but of greater importance, the level of experience which the British-Indian army had in engaging its opponent. Second, the uncertainty was compounded by concerns arising from the IJA's ability to inflict considerable delays and casualties on its Allies counterparts, in spite of its shortage of modern weapons and lack of adequate training in their use. Apprehensions could not be lifted until Allied forces had proven themselves capable of conducting operations against the Japanese without incurring excessive losses. The Fourteenth Army's victories at Imphal and Kohima in June 1944 did not discredit the IJA's ability to pose a difficult challenge. The only reassurance which field commanders could draw was that their own forces had developed the skills necessary to undertake their quest to dislodge the IJA from its positions in Burma.