A Confucian Criticism of Scientism: Revisiting the 1923 Controversy of the Life-View

Abstract

The life-views ( renshengguan ) of the supporters of scientism and of metaphysics in the 1923 controversy are distinct in their concept of the person, with consequences bearing on the nature of a proposed social order. This distinction became apparent when I deciphered the structure based on Confucian and Lebensphilosophie sources that underlie their views. Analysis demonstrates the radical approach of the supporters of science who are generally committed to a homogeneous context regardless of human or material. One attendant consequence of their argument is a concept of the person who realizes themselves in isolation from their surroundings. In contrast, the implicit framework of this-worldliness adopted by the supporters of metaphysics departs from the emotive and moral core of the person, acknowledging the resilience of lived experience. Endorsing the idea of human interrelatedness and interaction they denoted the heterogeneous context of human relations, contending that the person realizes herself in considerate responsiveness.