A Complex Experiential Account of Pleasure

Abstract

We will consider an argument for a complex experiential account for which pleasure is an experience toward which a subject has an intrinsic pro-attitude. The account will be seen to be subjectivist in that pleasure is a mind-dependent state. More specifically, it will be seen to depend solely on mental states and the relations between them. It will also be seen to be a non-correspondence account inasmuch as it is independent of mental states corresponding to the external world in a particular way that is held to be right. A pro-attitude is a positive orientation toward something and can include both cognitive and non-cognitive attitudes. An attitude that is noncognitive does not have a truth-value. Examples include emotions, preferences, desires, and intentions. Non-cognitive pro-attitudes are directed at fitting the world to the mind. Examples of cognitive attitudes include judgments, valuations, and beliefs. They are directed at fitting the mind to the world. An account of pleasure is central to an understanding of well-being and what is held to be good. For example, if subjectivism about well-being is correct, and if pleasure is the relevant subjective state, then well-being is a function of pleasure. Subjectivism about well-being allows us to say that how well a person’s life goes is solely a function of his mental states. A strong argument for subjectivism rests on intuitions that subjective states are necessary and sufficient for well-being. That such states are necessary can be seen in the widespread intuition that events or states that an individual is unaware of do not make his life go better. For example, the mere fact that a desire of an individual is satisfied, unconnected to his awareness