Abstract
This paper investigates how the characteristics of a Hong Kong‐listed firm influence its odds of going bankrupt, being acquired, and going private. A competing risks model is estimated. Our results reveal that larger firms are more vulnerable to bankruptcy, and that fast‐growing firms are more likely to be acquired. We also demonstrate that undervaluation is a key driver of going private. Despite the low agency cost due to the concentrated ownership structure, the propensity of Hong Kong‐listed firms to go private still increases with the level of free cash flow.
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